If you follow enough election-related news, you’ve probably heard the theory that party loyalists “come home” by Election Day. In other words, they may register their anger with their preferred party early on in an election cycle, but when push-comes-to-shove, they stay loyal to their party.

Largely, yes. In today’s hyperpartisan environment, voters are less likely to cross party lines. But two factors could complicate that conventional wisdom in 2026: whether each party’s voters are equally motivated to turn out, and whether some factions of Republicans are more willing to cross over.

The Senate races in Texas, Iowa, and Ohio, are good places to zoom in on the factors of 2026. These are states that Trump won in 2024 by an average 12.6-points, and he won in all three of his turns at the ballot box. But today, all three play host to competitive races. As with everything Political Rag does, following the data tells us why.

Polling from Fox News finds that in all three states, Democrats continue to exceed Republican enthusiasm to vote this year. But Fox News also distinguishes between MAGA and non-MAGA Republicans, which is where things get tricky for the GOP.

In all three states, MAGA enthusiasm is roughly on par with Democratic enthusiasm. But among the non-MAGA Republicans, enthusiasm drops an average 11-points below their MAGA counterparts. Compounding that problem for the GOP is that in every state, an average one-quarter of the non-MAGA Republicans indicate they’re planning to pull the lever for the Democratic candidate.

So, it begs the question, if the GOP is trying to juice Republican voter turnout, which Republicans are they trying to turn out? The strategy so far has been to send in President Trump or Vice President Vance to the competitive states, but what does that do for the non-MAGA Republicans? In Texas, for example, 53% of non-MAGA Republicans disapprove of the job the president is doing and 56% hold an unfavorable view of Republican nominee Ken Paxton. It’s a similar story in the other states, and it creates the possibility of a double-edged sword: causing non-MAGA Republicans, who already give low marks to the president, to stay home or further galvanize their support for the Democrat. Because at this point, just a few weeks out from Election Day, opinions are likely to be firmly set.

On the flip side, Democratic unity is all but universal, with crossover voting for the Republican senate candidate sitting at an average of less than three points – basically a rounding error. The Senate nominees – James Talarico, Josh Turek, and Sherrod Brown – all hold net-positive favorability ratings, versus their Republican opponents who are all well underwater. Combined with the high levels of voter enthusiasm, the party loyalist theory is holding up, so far, for Democrats in 2026.

It also is necessary to point out where independents sit in each of these races, which is a wide average of 33-points in favor of the Democratic nominee. It cannot be understated just how much of an advantage this is for Democrats. If Republicans were holding their own with independents, then none of these races would be in the conversation of the competitive senate map. In 2024, for example, President Trump won independents in Texas by 1-point and in Ohio by 2-points.

Some Republicans are questioning the accuracy of polling, saying (hoping?) that 2026 could be more like 2022, which saw a Republican trickle versus a wave against the then-Democratic majority. It’s a fair question to ask, but the environmental shift against Republicans is not theoretical. We’ve seen it happen already.

Look no further than Virginia’s 2025 gubernatorial election, when Democrat Abigail Spanberger won a 15-point landslide, all state officer positions flipped, and the Democratic majority expanded in the general assembly. This was not a special election (which some fairly argue is not the best indicator of future elections) and the 55% turnout matched the 2021 election when Republican Glenn Youngkin won the governor’s mansion, and the down-ballot results were the opposite of 2025.

Exit polling from CNN found Spanberger won 14% of non-MAGA Republicans. 9% of Republicans overall crossed over to vote for Spanberger, while just 1% of Democrats voted Republican; and Spanberger won independents by a wide 20-point margin.

Turnout in 2025 mattered significantly. Rural counties that normally support Republicans in the Old Dominion shifted by an average 12 points towards Democrats, helped by a 14-point drop in Republican turnout versus 2021 when Republican Glenn Youngkin won. In the major metropolitan areas of Virginia, Republican turnout dropped by an even larger 20 points. Democrats meanwhile experienced a 19-point and 17-point surge in turnout in each respective area compared to 2021.

None of this is theoretical. It happened. And it happened at a moment when the president still had a 42% approval rating, versus 37% today. An unpopular war with Iran had not sparked off. The national average price of a gallon of gasoline on Election Day 2005 was $3.05 and diesel was $3.75, versus $4.33 and $6.31 today, respectively.

What happens in November is anybody’s guess. But if we’re following the data and what this sour environment for Republicans has already produced, then we can at least know that the remaining days left in the election will feature highly competitive races up-and-down the ballot. Not just in swing states or districts, but more consequentially, in traditionally Republican strongholds.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

With Election Day just four weeks away, now is a good time to level set as things come to a head this midterm cycle. I’m not here to make any predictions about the outcome and the Mr. Fusion on my flux capacitor is in need of repair.

Political Rag only seeks to understand the environment and trends, weighed against historical outcomes. And right now, the environment is becoming increasingly difficult for Republicans to defend, the trends in the data are putting wind in Democratic sails, and if history is any guide, this combination is on track to produce mathematical difficulties for the GOP next month.

The reason isn’t simply because Donald Trump is unpopular. It isn’t even that voters are unhappy with the economy. It is not the Democrats lead on the generic ballot or that they’ve become the popular party (they haven’t). It’s that all three of these things are happening at the same time and the DeLorean is about to hit 88 mph.

Midterm elections have historically been a drag, at best, on the incumbent party. On average, a sitting president’s party loses 28 seats in the House and 4 seats in the Senate (coincidentally, the exact number that would flip control of the upper chamber this year). Incumbent party backlash is so common you can set your watch by it, since only 1998 and 2002 saw the incumbent party gain seats (after all, a broken watch is right twice a day — Save the Clock Tower!).

Midterms are usually a referendum on the sitting president, but even a popular president usually can’t prevent a backlash (Ronald Reagan? The actor?!). So, if we’re looking at Trump’s popularity, then things are especially not looking good for Republicans.

The president sits at an all-time-low approval rating of 37% (who’s Vice President? Jerry Lewis?!). This is lower than Trump’s 40% during the 2018 midterms which produced a Democratic House wave. It’s lower than Barack Obama’s 42% in 2010 which produced a Republican House wave. It’s lower than George W. Bush’s 38% in 2006 which saw Congress flip entirely to Democrats. It’s lower than Bill Clinton’s 46% in 1994 which saw the Republican Revolution in Congress.

The problem isn’t confined to one demographic group that has turned on the president. The president’s approval among independents sits at a toxic 26%. Women are at 32%. Though Trump made significant inroads with Hispanics in 2024, taking 46% of their vote, they now give him a 32% approval rating and a 65% disapproval. Even Trump’s once near-universal 91% approval rating among Republicans has slid to 75% – a strong number, no doubt, but consider that Biden still had an 85% approval rating among Democrats in Gallup’s tracking, right after losing the House in 2022.

Most telling is where white voters stand with the president and Republicans. Since 2000, the GOP has routinely won by double digits with this demographic that has the highest average turnout of any racial demographic at 73%. The one time that didn’t happen was in the 2006 midterms, in which Republicans eked out just a 4-point win margin with whites, on their way to losing the majority in both houses of Congress. Today, Republicans maintain just a 1.9-point lead among whites in the average of generic ballot polling.

Then there is the economy.

The irony here is hard to overstate. In 2024, 75% of Americans indicated inflation had caused their families some sort of economic hardship. Donald Trump won 64% of these voters, and therefore the election. But that same level of economic dissatisfaction is now working against the president.

The cost of living and inflation dominate voters’ concerns. Fox News polling found 34% of voters identify costs at their top issue, while another 14% say the economy generally. Even more consequential is CBS/YouGov polling that found 95% of likely voters rate the current cost spikes anywhere from inconvenient-to-a hardship. Among the 68% who have said prices have caused them difficulties or hardships Democrats hold a 21-point advantage this fall over Republicans. And President Trump can hardly tell Americans it’s Joe Biden’s fault (as he is wont to do) because 56% of likely voters believe Trump bears responsibility for the current economy versus 20% who say Biden.

Then there are the electoral consequences themselves.

Democrats currently lead the generic ballot by nine points. That lead isn’t driven in just traditionally blue states. Every state has shifted 9.6 points toward Democrats compared with its 2024 presidential result. Even the typically noncompetitive red states have moved an average 8.4 points towards Democrats, while the ten red states with a competitive Senate race this year have shifted an average of 9.4 points.

It’s that final number Republicans should be watching most closely. That 9.4-point shift isn’t about Democratic enthusiasm in blue states. It’s a shifting political environment in places Republicans would normally consider safe. That isn’t driven by Republican defections. 89% of Republicans still have a positive view of their party. It’s that independents have significantly turned against the GOP, indicating a 15-point preference for Democrats in the generic ballot averages, with 54% saying their vote for Democrats is more a vote against President Trump.

None of this guarantees a Democratic landslide. Like I said, I don’t get into the business of making predictions. But if we removed Donald Trump’s name from the equation and applied this environment to any president, regardless of party, it would still be difficult to argue that party is going to come out ahead once balloting begins.

And balloting has begun. Nearly 1.3 million votes have already been cast, and over 52 million mail ballots have been requested. The time for President Trump and the GOP to convince anyone other than loyal Republicans to vote for them is nearly up. And that’s assuming loyal Republicans show up, with a Fox News poll finding just 53% of Republicans are interested in voting this year, compared to 64% of Democrats.

A word on polling and data. Some might ask, what if the polling is wrong? They might point out polls underestimated Trump in 2016. Others might consider Democrat Mikie Sherrill’s 14-point romp in New Jersey which one poll just days before showed a 1-point race. Both observations would be right. The polls could very well be underestimating Republicans, and we get a blue trickle instead of a wave, or they could be underestimating Democrats, and we get a wave that realigns the map. But polls are the best data we have to work with, and all campaigns use them. Until Doc Brown shows up with the DeLorean to tell us what happens in the future, we don’t have other places to turn. But I’m not holding my breath because we still don’t have hoverboards, and wearing multiple ties with a suit still hasn’t become fashionable, despite my best efforts.

So, with just four weeks until polls close, the question isn’t whether Republicans are facing a difficult midterm. They are. The question is how much the political environment has shifted, putting Senate seats in reliably red states in play, and whether there is enough time left for Republicans to move it back.

Today, the numbers aren’t encouraging for Republicans.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

September polling has been particularly good for Democrats and especially brutal for Republicans. But in case you have not been paying attention up until this point (and honestly, who can blame you if you haven’t?), September is just another month in a continuing leftward swing nationwide, which is starting to peak at the right moment for Democrats as early voting is now underway in much of the country.

In the 2024 presidential election, the average result across the 50 states was a 6.7-point Republican win margin. Based on the state-by-state calculations, that represented an 11.1-point average shift toward Republicans compared with 2020, when the average state result was a 4.4-point Democratic margin. The 2020 result itself represented a smaller 2.3-point shift compared with 2016.

But if 2024 represented a substantial rightward shift, 2026 is gearing up to represent a large shift to the left.

The interactive map below explains why.

As of September, the congressional generic ballot polling indicates a national environment that is now averaging a 1.9-point Democratic environment across the fifty states. That’s not a popular vote estimate, but the average of each state’s generic ballot. That might not seem like a huge Democratic advantage nationally, but as they say, the devil is in the details.

When looking at the intensity of the Democratic environment, all fifty states have shifted left by an average 8.6-points and a median percentage of 8.1-points, relative to its 2024 presidential win margin.

September 27 Update: The map has been updated to reflect a 2.5-point Democratic environment across all states. Every state has shifted left an average 9.2-points and a median 8.6-points.

October 4 Update: The map has been updated to reflect a 2.9-point Democratic environment across all states. Every state has shifted left an average 9.6-points and a median 9.1-points. This is 3.5-points more Democratic just in the last six months, indicating continued momentum in Democrats favor.

Of course, there are some states that are going to skew that average. Wyoming, for example, has shifted the least to the left by 3.6-points, still giving it a whopping 42% Republican advantage on the 2026 generic ballot. Rhode Island has shifted the furthest left by 18.3-points, giving Democrats a massive 32% lead on the generic ballot. Neither of these states is going to be competitive for the opposite party, so let’s instead focus on the most competitive states.

The seven swing states of both 2020 and 2024 (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) collectively have shifted 8-points to the left and have an average 5.4-point Democratic tilt in 2026. All seven states host a competitive race for governor, senate, or house. The states with the most competitive senate races, rated tossup or Lean D/R by Cook Political Report (Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas) have shifted left by an average 8.8-points and have an average 2-point Democratic tilt.

What about just those competitive senate states that were solidly Republican in 2024 with a 13.4-point average win margin for Trump (Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Ohio, and Texas)? An 8.9-point average shift to the left and a 4.5-point Republican tilt on the generic ballot. This demonstrates just how badly the environment has deteriorated for Republicans but also shows just how high of a hurdle Democrats have to overcome to win in these states. However, that eroding environment for Republicans is the reason these states are in the competitive mix now.

The leftward swing has not yet shown any signs of abating.

Roughly six months ago, at the start of April, the state-by-state generic ballot showed a half-point Republican tilt, and a 6.1-point leftward shift relative to 2024. Since then, that pendulum has continued swinging left, becoming 2.4-points more Democratic on the generic ballot. It’s why states like Georgia and North Carolina are starting to look out of reach for Republicans and states like Kansas and Nebraska are becoming more competitive.

It’s why things appear to be peaking for Democrats at just the right moment with just over a month until Election Day. Or, more likely, because things are crumbling at just the wrong moment for the GOP.

The national Democratic Party is not enjoying a popular upswell in support. The party averages just a 38% approval rating, on par with President Trump’s own 37% approval rating. But as I’ve written before (See here: The Midterm Lens), a midterm election is usually a referendum on the party in power, and the pendulum only swings two ways in America. As I wrote last week (See here: The Midterm Curse), every incumbent president uses the same playbook of defend, attack, and promise, but it rarely works out in the end when his party loses seats in congress. As such, despite their own unpopularity, Democrats hold onto an 8.1-point lead on the generic ballot nationally over Republicans.

The factors that are causing this barely need to be explained as most Americans are living it with gasoline prices continually spiking, inflation rising, and the general cost of living up overall. It was these factors that swept Trump back into office. These same factors now imperil the Republican majority.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

Nearly every sitting president must face the midterm curse – the maxim that the party that holds the White House will likely lose seats in the House (and usually, but not always, the Senate) once voters get to cast their judgement on the incumbent government. And every president, regardless of party, has done what he could to stop the rule from remaining true on his watch. But looking back at every midterm election since 1938 (and the advent of scientific public polling), the executive branch is averaging just a 9% success rate helping the president’s party in the legislative branch stave off defeat.

Even with a low success rate, incumbent presidents deploy the same tactics each time. They either make the elections about defending or advancing the agenda they were elected on just two years prior, attack the alternative, deliver a pledge about what the next two years could bring, and usually combine all three.

In 1938, President Roosevelt made the election a referendum on the coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans who opposed his New Deal agenda, attacked them for only paying lip service to the reforms he was offering, and implored Americans to pick candidates for Congress who have already proven they can deliver for the country. In a fireside radio address, just days before the election, he framed the fight by saying, “New ideas cannot be administered successfully by men with old ideas, for the first essential of doing a job well is the wish to see the job done at all.”

Democrats went on to lose 72 House seats and 8 Senate seats. Not to mention 12 gubernatorial flips.

The problem for President Roosevelt and all of his successors is that regardless of the success of their own election, their personal popularity (FDR had a 60% approval near Election Day), or what they believe is the purity, altruism, or enlightenment of their ideas, voters are looking at things through a very different perspective. Usually that takes the form of opposition to policy, macro factors such as economic conditions, or even the leadership of the president himself. While history can eventually prove president’s right (93% of Americans today have a positive view of Social Security), even new government programs can initially be seen as federal overreach – exactly a key piece of the opposition to the New Deal in the 1930’s.

The midterm curse goes on from there, uninterrupted until 1998. Eight midterm elections saw the incumbent president sitting on a positive approval rating around Election Day (Ford was at 50% – good enough). Six saw the president sitting on a negative rating. The president makes his pitch, sometimes paints it in stark terms, and in all fourteen election his party goes on to lose seats in the House. It wasn’t until Bill Clinton in 1998 and George W. Bush in 2002 beat the curse, but even Clinton experienced it in 1994, while Bush saw a thumpin’ (his words) in 2006. And the curse has continued, unabated, since 2006.

That brings us to the 2026 midterms. Last week, at an unconventional midterm convention, President Trump made his pitch, as all his predecessors have done. And like his predecessors, he has followed a familiar playbook:

· Defend/Advance the Agenda: downplay inflation, talk tough on the war with Iran, tout the One Big Beautiful Bill

· Attack the Alternative: Liken Democrats to communists

· Make a Pledge: $5,000 “Trump Dividend” for every American adult if Republicans retain control of Congress

The problem for the president is not that, apart from the $5,000 dividend pledge, his pitch is historically unusual. It’s that he is attempting the same maneuver presidents have repeatedly attempted from a relatively weak political position. His approval rating sits at 38%, while polling consistently has Democrats ahead on the generic congressional ballot.

Whether the playbook works this time around remains to be seen, but history shows us that even if Trump and Republicans were riding a high wave of support, the GOP would still be likely to lose seats in the House. As it were, history shows us that a president with a negative approval rating has never had his party gain House seats in a midterm.

The point isn’t that presidents shouldn’t campaign for their parties in midterms. The point is that presidential persuasion has historically been a weak force against the underlying dynamics of a midterm election. Even if voters like a president’s agenda, approve of his performance, or even agree that the opposition would make things worse, midterms give voters an opportunity to register their dissatisfaction with the direction of the country.

They overwhelmingly use it.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

New data out from Gallup finds a growing divergence in American adults identifying as Democrats, or independents who lean toward the Democratic Party, versus those who say Republican.

As of Q2, it’s a ten-point gap, with 49% identifying as Democrats or Democratic-leaners, and 39% as Republican or leaning Republican. That’s a substantial swing from two years ago when Gallup found that 46% were in the GOP camp versus 44% for the Democrats during the same period. At the same time, Democrats continue to hold a modest advantage in the generic congressional ballot.

This is a considerable Democratic advantage in the national partisan environment that history tells us can produce a wave election. Just as early voters are beginning to receive their ballots for November, it’s worth considering whether 2026 will be another wave year.

What a wave in 2026 looks like is not something we can determine yet, and waves always look like they were obvious after all the votes have been counted. Right now, a double-digit partisan environment is looking like a mid-single digit Democratic advantage in the House. But history tells us that even small shifts in the partisan environment can lead to major shifts in voters’ preferences.

Let’s define a wave in the House as a double-digit change gain/loss and a flip/expanding party control. In the wave years of 1994, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2018 there was either a significant contraction of the gap between Democratic and Republican preference (typically favoring the former) that led to massive Republican gains in 1994 and 2010; or there was a widening of the gap that led to Democratic waves in 2006, 2008, and 2018. There are, of course, instances when the narrowing/widening of the partisan gap didn’t lead to a major change in the House, but the dynamics of the election matter, such as 1996 and 2012, which we can classify as status quo elections when the incumbent Democratic presidents won re-election, while his party picked up a few seats in the House, but not enough to win back the huge majority the Republicans won in the previous midterm election.

But it’s not enough to just say party preference is the determining factor and call it a day. The context here matters significantly. For each of those five wave years, the large swings in party preference came because of backlash to the party in power. That’s typical in wave elections since there are essentially two choices American voters get, and as much as party loyalists want to believe that everyone thinks like them, Pew Research has shown us that only 39% of voters are staunchly committed to either the Democrats or the GOP. That doesn’t mean 61% of the country are registered independents (Gallup finds independents represent about 44% of the country before they decide which way they lean), but it does mean that a sizable portion of the country is open to bucking the party they voted for last time (or even the last several).

Which brings us to 2026. The partisan gap doesn’t directly correlate to the number of seats a party could win. A larger partisan gap has historically been tied to larger electoral swings, but it’s not a one-to-one relationship. The current partisan balance is in the range that Democrats enjoyed in 2008 before Barack Obama’s landslide election, and higher than the 8-point advantage the party had before its 2006 wave election in George W. Bush’s final two years in the White House.

The major reasons driving this in 2026, of course, are economic concerns around rising costs. The problem is compounded by voter opposition to Trump’s policies on tariffs and the war with Iran, that voters see as a major culprit. The president, for his part, seems all too happy to put himself and his policies at the center of the election, giving his party little breathing room to separate themselves from him, where appropriate. Republicans’ clearest counterstrategy is to make the election a referendum on Democrats and their most progressive candidates (pour a cold glass of Haterade). Whether this strategy is successful remains to be seen. The president’s approval rating has been stuck below 40%, and 2026 is not 2024 or 2022, where backlash was against Democratic policies and Joe Biden, who is now retired.

Trump and Republicans are eager to paint all Democrats as socialists, given the rise of Democratic Socialist candidates in a handful of primaries, but this may not bear the fruit the incumbent party hopes it will. A summer survey from CNBC found that endorsements from the president made 52% of voters less likely to support a Republican candidate, and 57% of voters were less likely to support a candidate that described themselves as MAGA. Comparatively, 50% of voters were less likely to support a candidate that described themselves as Democratic Socialists.

For their part, Democrats cannot just be the opposition party (though it certainly helps). They also need to skate where the puck is going – to put it another way – speak to voters’ concerns. Democratic candidates have been very message disciplined talking about economic concerns and making the election a referendum on the president. They will also need effective responses to charges of socialism. Gallup finds that 81% of Americans still rate free enterprise positively, while just 39% feel the same about socialism. If the question becomes one of fairness, basic services, or the social safety net, 52% of independents, and even 19% of Republicans have positive views. How Democrats talk about these things will matter.

The national environment is plainly more favorable to Democrats than it was two years ago. The partisan balance has moved sharply, the generic ballot has moved with it, and history shows that environments of this magnitude can produce significant House swings. But the historical record also shows that national vote share is an imperfect predictor of seats.

The question for the next 56 days isn’t whether the environment has shifted. It has. The question is how effectively Democrats translate that environment into individual congressional races — and whether Republicans can change the terms of the election with a rapidly closing window of opportunity to do so. Because ballots are already beginning to circulate.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

Welcome to September! We’re in the ber months, which means summer is over, vacations are done, kids are back in school, and in my house Hocus Pocus will be streamed approximately 537 times until Halloween. But crucially, the midterms enter a new phase: execution.

Over the last several months the focus has been on the theoretical – what could happen in the election by examining polling and historical trends. But now we move into what is happening. Because voters don’t decide in 63 days on November 3. They are going to start receiving ballots in three days.

North Carolina leads all states with absentee ballots being mailed to voters on September 4. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia, in all, begin voting in September through a combination of absentee, no excuse mail balloting, and early in-person voting (AL, DC, ID, IL, MD, MI, MN, MS, NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OK, RI, SD, VA, VT, WI). That’s over 69 million registered voters, more than 30% of all registered voters in the U.S., who will soon be able to begin voting. Some of those states are playing host to hotly contested races that could decide control of Congress.

So, with that in mind, let’s level-set about what is driving voters as ballots start to circulate.

As I’ve previously written, one of the most important indicators of what direction the country will head in a midterm election is the approval rating of the sitting President of the United States. And as the ballots become available, that’s bad news for Republicans.

President Trump currently sits at a 38% approval rating nationwide. His approval rating with independents hovers around an anemic 21-26%, depending on the poll. His approval rating with Republicans stands at 80%, which yes, is solid. But consider that President Biden had an 85% approval rating with Democrats just after Election Day in the 2022 Midterms. That 80% approval rating is also 7 points lower than where it was at this time during the 2018 Midterms in Trump’s first term.

State-by-state, the president is underwater in his approval ratings with likely voters in 40 states. None of the ten states where he is still in a positive range were swing states in 2024. In the seven swing states of 2024 (AZ, GA, MI, NC, NV, PA, WI), all of which Trump carried, his approval rating is underwater by an average 14 points. Georgia, Michigan, and North Carolina all host marquee Senate races. Even solidly red states such as Alaska, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas all give Trump low approval ratings now. Each state hosts a hotly contested Senate race.

What’s driving these trends? The same thing that has been the dominant issue since the post-Covid inflation run-up – costs. The single largest issue that defined Biden/Harris’s re-election challenge. And likely the single biggest issue that is on track to swing back against Republicans in November.

Trump’s policies are not helping Republicans’ cause here either. He has a staggering 70% disapproval rating on his handling of inflation yet continues to drive economic policies that most Americans believe are making costs worse – tariffs and the War in Iran. 61% of Americans believe Trump’s policies are making inflation worse, up from 45% after winning a second term in 2024. Support for the war with Iran has only grown by 1.5% since it began, with 35.1% of Americans supporting military action in the beginning and 36.6% supporting it today. Opposition has grown from 47% to 55%. Either issue would be politically consequential on its own. Together they create a strong headwind for any incumbent party.

Polling has consistently shown that costs, inflation, and the economy generally remain voters’ top concerns. New August polling has found that the war with Iran is now entering Americans’ minds as a more pressing concern, being listed as the third most important issue behind costs and economy. Voters trust Democrats on handling each of these more than they do Republicans.

Taking these factors into account, with ballots beginning to arrive in voters’ hands in just a couple days, the window for persuading voters is rapidly closing. To stave off a Democratic wave election, Republicans’ best bet may be switching to a turnout operation among the most loyal of Republican voters.

But will they turn out?

A significant enthusiasm gap currently exists between Democrats and Republicans, with the former holding an 11-point edge among their core base being motivated to vote. This is consistent for any “out” party in a midterm year. But such a gap can be devastating.

Looking at the 2025 gubernatorial election in Virginia, where Democrat Abigail Spanberger won a 15-point landslide, offers a useful illustration about why enthusiasm and turnout matter. That year, rural counties that normally support Republican in the Old Dominion shifted by an average 12 points towards Democrats, helped by a 14-point drop in Republican turnout versus 2021 when Republican Glenn Youngkin won the governor’s mansion. In the major metropolitan areas of Virginia, Republican turnout dropped by an even larger 20 points. Democrats meanwhile experienced a 19-point and 17-point surge in turnout in each respective area compared to 2021. And what was the driving issue of the election? The economy. And economy-focused voters favored Spanberger by a 27-point margin. Overall voter turnout in both 2021 and 2025 was about 55%.

This might explain the midterm convention the GOP is hosting in Dallas this month, coinciding with the start of early voting, that the RNC promises will be a “primetime showcase for President Trump’s success.” Party conventions often do little to sway the persuadable voters. This will be, above all, an effort to juice Republican enthusiasm. But a midterm convention is unlikely to generate the kind of primetime attention that the typical presidential convention receives – let alone one that will interfere with the start of the NFL season. As I routinely tell candidates, don’t mess with voters’ football viewing habits. We may be a nation founded on the freedom of religion, but our joint houses of worship can be found inside football stadiums. If an independent or unenthused Republican has a choice between a premier NFL game on TV and an unpopular president pushing policies already deemed unpopular by most Americans, it remains to be seen whether this event will hit the mark.

^{© 2026 Center Field Strategies LLC | Political Rag is an imprint of Center Field Strategies}

A Reuters/Ipsos poll out in late June asked Americans the question if they thought it has been worth the United States taking military action in Iran. Just 24% of the registered voters polled said yes. 55% said no, including 55% of independents and even one-quarter of Republicans.

The conflict with Iran never started from a position of widespread support from the American public. The average of polling from Silver Bulletin found that on March 1, just a couple days after the conflict began, 35% of Americans were supportive while 47% were opposed. Four months later, 35% of Americans are still supportive while opposition has grown to 57%.

With the Midterms looming it naturally begs the question of how the war will make its mark on the election? History offers some useful clues.

Midterm elections and wars have intersected in a major way five times since the advent of public polling. Looking at World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq we find strong “rally-round-the-flag” effects for the president in the opening phase of each of these conflicts, usually followed by public backlash when voters reach the polls.

In the first four instances, public opinion had not turned against the war by the time of the respective midterms. America had only been involved in World War II for just under a year by the time of 1942 midterms and public support for the war was still near universal, and President Roosevelt enjoyed a high level of support. Instead, most historians agree what Americans were frustrated with was mismanagement on the homefront with costs and rationing. Some historians believe too that FDR’s personal popularity was shielding frustrations with his party and Congressional Democrats took the heat the midterms.

A similar situation occurred with President Truman by the time of the Korean War. Most Americans still supported the aims of the war, especially in terms of seeing it as part of the communist containment strategy. However, Truman began to lose the support of the public for his management of the war abroad and management of the country at home with rising inflation and shortages. The country was also on year seventeen of full Democratic control and was beginning to look toward Republicans for new leadership.

By Vietnam, President Johnson was riding a high wave of support when he committed troops to southeast Asia just four months after his landslide re-election in 1964. A large majority of the country still believed in containing communism, and Vietnam was the next battlefield. By the time of the midterms in 1966, most of the country still supported the war, but Johnson’s personal popularity began to fall, again mainly due to views of his mismanagement of the war and the homefront. His party took the brunt at the ballot box.

Enter the twenty-first century, and most of us know the story. George W. Bush was perceived as a strong leader post-9/11 and was seen as successfully executing the war in Afghanistan (the “good war” as it would later be termed in comparison to Iraq). A year later, the 2002 midterms proved the lone exception as it was widely supported, and Bush continued to be seen as a solid leader both at home and abroad. When the administration made its case for attacking Iraq in 2003, it was seen as part of the broader War on Terror. Though Bush’s popularity had declined by 2004 from massive highs, he still won re-election. But by the time of the 2006 midterms, public opinion had turned massively sour not just from perceiving the war as a mistake, but also for mismanagement on the homefront (e.g., spending, Hurricane Katrina, etc.). Once again, the party in power took a “thumpin’” as Bush called it.

Fast forward to today.

The conflict with Iran never enjoyed widespread support. Trump has Truman/Bush levels of popularity currently. At the moment, Iran does not register as a top level of concern for the American public, especially as they’re thinking about their vote for the fall. But where it does come into play is how Americans are evaluating the administration as a whole. They never supported the conflict from the start and fewer do today. The war has added to higher energy costs and disruption in global commerce. Americans have said repeatedly this year that costs and inflation are their primary concerns. They give Trump low marks for his management on the homefront.

Taken together, history suggests Republicans face the kind of environment that has historically been difficult for incumbent parties. The lesson isn’t that wars automatically doom presidents. It’s that wars become another test of presidential leadership. As I’ve written before, midterms are all judged by voters through the lens of the sitting president (See here: The Midterm Lens). By the time voters reach the ballot box they tend to judge the administration’s overall management — not merely whether they support the conflict itself that plays into their thought process.

White voters have long been a core base of support for the Republican Party. In the past twenty-four years (2000-2024), they have consistently won this demographic by double digits, even in years that the party lost at the top of the ballot (i.e., presidential or congressional races). Whites are also the most consistent racial demographic group to vote, averaging about a 73% turnout, though today whites account for about 57% of the country.

The double-digit Republican backing has happened in all but one election since 2000.

2006 was a blue wave year for the Democratic Party, in which Republicans eked out just a 4-point margin with white voters, on their way to losing five Senate seats, 31 House seats, and the majority in Congress. Generic congressional ballot polling today is flashing a bright red warning sign for Republicans, in which they hold just an 8-point lead among white voters.

^{Sources: CNN Exit Polls, Decision Desk HQ | Note: There was no exit polling released in 2002 due to an error in collecting the data, but given the strong Republican victory that year, it is reasonable to assume the GOP carried white voters by a large number.}

The parallels between this year and the midterms twenty years ago are revealing and paint a bleak picture for Republicans if something doesn’t improve their fortunes heading into the fall.

To start, remember that a midterm election is always a reflection of the sitting president. On Election Day in 2006, exit polling found that George W. Bush had a 42% approval rating at 58% disapproval rating, including 43% who strongly disapproved. The Iraq War weighed heavily on voters deciding who to cast a ballot for, with 57% disapproving of the conflict, and 80% of disapprovers casting a vote for their Democratic candidate for Congress. 82% of voters that year said the state of the economy was important in their decision, with 54% of economy-concerned voters casting their ballots for Democrats.

Flash forward to today.

President Trump currently sits below Bush’s rating on Election Day 2006, with a 38.7% approval rating and 58.5% disapproval rating, including 48% who strongly disapprove. The war in Iran is opposed by 57% of Americans and has never had more than 40% support. Economic concerns are voters top concern right now and 62% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the economy, and 70% disapprove on his handling of inflation.

Specifically, among whites, there are significant negative feelings. A poll from The Economist/YouGov finds that 62% of whites want to end the war in Iran immediately. Just 27% rate the economy as good. Economic, inflation, and jobs dominate rank as their top concerns at 43%, the next highest issues (health care and immigration) both at 9%.

Have the Republicans managed to build a buffer with House seats through mid-decade redistricting? Yes, undoubtedly, they’ll have protected a few extra seats. But with such badly eroding numbers among a consistent and large demographic group, the handful of protected seats are unlikely to offset potentially dozens of seats that flip Democratic, and additionally keeps the Senate in play to turn Democratic.

Without a significant course correction from the president, 2026 is starting to look like 2006 for Republicans.

In case you missed it, and judging by the results it showed, some people may have, Pew Research Center released data this week breaking down the typical red versus blue partisan divide that we assign to elections, and pretty much everything else nowadays. Raise your hand if you’ve ever been told you’re not patriotic enough because you listen to more punk rock than you do country (slowly raises hand).

But the bottom line from the survey was this – Americans hold a complex mix of opinions and values that can’t be fit neatly into one of two boxes (aka: our two-party system). We vote the way we vote because those are essentially our choices, and as Drew Westen’s research in The Political Brain shows us, we internally rationalize our choice even if we don’t like it. And only a minority of us are committed to the core to the tenets of a single party. The graphic below from Pew breaks it down.

I won’t define all of these, but I encourage you to read the article from Pew to see what each means. But for the GOP, there is the No Apologies Right and the Faith First Conservatives, who are the most committed to the party and to Donald Trump. They make up 21% of voters. On the left, there are the Loyal Liberals and Leftward Progressives, who are the most committed to the Democratic Party, if somewhat skeptically in the case of the Leftward Progressives. These two groups make up 18% of voters.

Doing the math here (always a risk for me in public), that’s 39% of voters from both parties who are the most loyal, most tuned into politics, and the highest propensity voters. For the conservative side, the two groups turned out to vote in 2024 by an average 77%. For the liberal side, the two groups turned out by an average 72%. But what about the other 61% of the country? Those five groups turned out to vote by just an average 51%.

And why should they turn out? Just an average 17% of those five groups think there is always or often at least one candidate who shares their views. They have a collective 60% unfavorable view of the GOP and a 55% unfavorable view of the Democratic Party.

What drives those sentiments? Well, look at how they feel about issues. Collectively, 38% feel that the U.S. economic system is only somewhat fair. 66% believe illegal immigration is a problem. 55% believe we need stricter gun control laws. 55% aren’t overly concerned about the status of the wealthy.

I just threw out four red meat issues consistently served up on either side, respectively, to the 39%, that are used to stir up both sides. Of course, we know why. They’re the loudest voices in politics, drowning out what the larger majorities of Americans think and feel about the issues that impact us.

I teach a nonpartisan campaign school. Through the years I’ve had a mix of over 600 Democratic and Republican office-seekers in 23 states who have sat in front of me and my advice is the same to each of them regardless of party – candidates who build large coalitions and win with large majorities aren’t appealing to that 39%. They’re appealing to the other 61%. That doesn’t mean the 39% don’t have opinions that matter. They absolutely do, as every American does. But if you’re only trying to placate the 39%, you’ll lose, or win by the barest margin, at best. Do the 2016, 2020, and 2024 presidential elections ring any bells? Now consider the elections of Ronald Reagan or Barack Obama. Yes, I just threw out two presidents reviled by their opposition. That’s the point (see my About page: “Spinning, I’m not here to do anyones”).

So, we’ve got an election coming up. If either party wants to command a bigger majority in Congress, they should figure out how to talk to the 61%. If either can do this and then govern in a way focused on the big ideas that have large, supportive majorities of the public, and tune out the noise that appeals to just their own share of the 39%, then that party could set themselves up for a long-standing majority.

If either is willing to do so.

The simple math says that for Democrats to reclaim the Senate majority in 2026, they need to net a four-seat pickup this fall. It’s looking increasingly likely that they at least nab one seat with Roy Cooper in North Carolina. Beyond that, it’s looking like a harder climb up hill given that any path to the majority goes through states that Trump won in 2024.

But if we peel back a layer of the onion, we find a much more competitive landscape that works in Democrats favor.

There has not been a ton of reliable polling done yet and there are certainly dynamics in each individual race that can swing things toward one party. But we can look at the overall trends in the election by examining the generic congressional ballot.

As I have previously written about (see here: Can Redistricting Save Republicans?) every state in the country has moved left by some degree, relative to its 2024 presidential outcome. That makes things interesting for House races and especially interesting for the Senate. The 12 races in the table below explain why.

Source: 2024 Presidential Results, Silver Bulletin, Cook Political Report

Each of these races, except for Florida and Kansas, is currently expected to have some level of competitiveness. The numbers tell the tale. Relative to their 2024 presidential margin, each state has continued to drift leftward. Over the last three months, the generic ballot in each state has become bluer, and as of June, each state has swung an average 7.5% to the left.

In the most competitive or purple states like Georgia, Maine, or North Carolina, this isn’t that surprising. But look closer at a state like Florida. Incumbent Republican Senator Ashley Moody is currently expected to have a solid run to re-election, but Florida has made nearly a double-digit swing to the left, now sitting just below a 4% Republican advantage on the generic ballot. Recent polling from Cook Political Report found that any Congressional district that President Trump carried by 10% or less in 2024 could go Democratic in 2026. Trump carried Florida by 13-points but has drifted nearly 10-points left. If that trend continues, a combination of a strong challenger from Democrats with enough money and the right message puts Florida in play.

The same goes for each of the states in the table above currently held by a Republican. That’s why states like Ohio are a Toss Up or Alaska is a Lean Republican. Democrats recruited strong, well-known challengers who have been prolific fundraisers.

One high quality poll of Ohio that came out recently from Fox News highlights why states that have been reliably Republican are suddenly competitive. The poll found former Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown with a 53-45% lead over Republican Jon Husted, who was appointed to fill the seat vacated by Vice President Vance. The fact Brown is above 50% with only 2% undecided is a telling sign.

But what’s driving Brown’s numbers is the same story we’ve seen around the country – concerns about economic issues. A combined 51% of Ohioans rated inflation and jobs as their top issue when deciding how to vote. 39% of voters said they are falling behind in their personal financial situation while 49% said they’re holding steady. Browns support is not driven just by the typical Democratic voters either. He’s winning independents by a wide 18-point margin, men with 51%, and even pulling in 45% of non-college white voters and 43% of rural voters, two key groups for Trump in all three of his elections.

Brown’s supporters are almost much more likely to turn out. 60% of Democrats are extremely motivated to vote, versus 53% of Republicans. An even higher 66% of 2024 Harris voters are extremely motivated to vote, versus 52% of 2024 Trump voters. Like most incumbent presidents, Trump suffers from his coalition failing to turn out when he’s not on the ballot. This could be driven by President Trump’s 57% disapproval rating the Buckeye State, which includes 48% of non-college whites and 49% of rural residents.

Now, let’s level set here.

This is a much more competitive map and creates more paths to a majority for Democrats, but still one with an uphill climb. Their most likely opportunity to net four seats comes through Alaska, Maine, North Carolina, and Ohio. But it’s only North Carolina that is starting to look the most promising as former Democratic Governor Roy Cooper is fairly popular while former RNC Chairman Michael Watley is largely unknown. Alaska has a history of electing Democrats and Mary Peltola has proven before she can win statewide, but the state is still pretty Republican. In Maine, Democratic nominee Graham Platner is plagued by scandal, and incumbent Republican Susan Collins has faced tough races before and always prevailed. Ohio is starting to look better for Democrats but is still not as fertile a field as a purple state like North Carolina.

The next best opportunities for Democrats are Iowa and Texas. I’ve previously written about why Texas is now in play (see here: Yes, Ken Paxton could lose Texas), but still a tough slog for Democrats. Iowa will feature several competitive races for governor, three U.S. House seats, as well as the Senate. But Iowa has been a reliably Republican state at nearly every level on the ballot for more than a decade.

States like Florida and Kansas would be a real reach for Democrats. While Florida has swung heavily left in polling since 2024, it is still a state that has eluded Democrats at nearly every statewide office since Barack Obama was the last presidential candidate to win it in 2012. In Kansas, Governor Laura Kelly has proven a Democrat can win statewide against a controversial Republican opponent. Incumbent Senator Roger Marshall has angered a lot of his constituents, but his potential biggest threats to re-election, Representative Sharice Davids, and Governor Kelly herself, both passed on a run against him.

Nebraska is interesting with Dan Osborn running as an independent. Osborn came within 6 points of defeating Republican Senator Deb Fischer in 2024, an impressive feat considering Trump carried the state by 20-points. Osborn has been a strong fundraiser and if Democratic nominee Cindy Burbank drops out, as some expect her to, Osborn could have a more favorable environment than he did two years ago to make the case for an independent senator, though many suspect he would caucus with the Democrats.

This assumes Democrats don’t lose any seats and right now they’re slogging through a bitter primary to hold onto a seat in Michigan. So, everything must go right for Democrats. But also, everything seems to be going wrong right now for Republicans. Gas prices remain high while the war in Iran grinds on. President Trump, fixated on vanity projects while saying he “loves the inflation,” continues to sink to new lows in popularity.

But contrary to a lot of punditry, this is competitive map. Nothing is guaranteed for either party. Republicans maintain the edge, but Democrats have a clear path toward a majority, albeit one that goes uphill.

Over the coming months a lot of ink will be spilled about Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s many scandals. As if that is possible considering how much Senator John Cornyn and the NRSC already did that. It is certainly easy to focus on those and frankly gets more eyeballs.

But just under the surface of all that are the issues that Paxton is running on — or more appropriately, not running on.

We don’t need to litigate why costs and inflation are the key concern of Americans heading into the midterms. We all feel it in some form, and it is a concern that has bedeviled just about any incumbent democratic government anyplace on Earth. But what is Ken Paxton focused on heading into the general election phase of his race against Democratic State Rep. James Talarico?

Other than coming up with nicknames for Talarico, his actual policy proposals are nowhere near what’s on the minds of the voters of Texas. His talking points are to “carry the torch” for Trump, America First foreign policy, border security, blaming Joe Biden for the national debt, and supporting cryptocurrency.

His own website says:

The radical left is determined to undermine our conservative values, and too often there are RINO Republicans willing to help them do it. We’ve seen an unprecedented assault on our Constitutional freedoms — like our 2^nd Amendment rights — from “Republicans” and Democrats alike. Ken Paxton is running to stop the career politicians who are attacking our way of life. He will stand with President Trump to protect our gun rights, defend the unborn, and defeat the radical transgender movement that’s desperate to put men in girls’ sports and woke indoctrination in our classrooms.

This is a base appeal, which works best when the momentum is on the side of one’s party. But base appeal only gets a candidate so far when their broader universe of voters – the general electorate – are focused on policies that have more immediate impact on their lives.

Polling from the Texas Politics Project at The University of Texas has found that 86% of Texans indicate concern about the rising cost of gasoline, including 61% who say they are very concerned. This, of course, is driven by the War in Iran, which the poll found that just 36% of Texans support, versus the 49% who are opposed. 55% of Texans believe that Trump’s tariff policies have hurt their family economically, including 81% of independents and nearly a third of Republicans. Overall, just 26% of Texans said their personal economic situation has improved over the last year, versus 39% who have said they’re now worse off. Another third indicated it’s about the same. Paxton is also continuing to tie himself firmly to Trump, who is underwater in the Lone Star State with a 50% disapproval rating versus a 42% approval rating, including 73% of independents who disapprove.

Even the strongest issue for Republicans – immigration and border security – is falling in importance to Texans. Among the top eight issues identified by voters in the Texas Politics Project poll found immigration as the fourth most important issue with 8% of voters indicating as such, and border security coming in seventh at 4%. This isn’t localized to Democrats and Independents either. Only 20% of Republicans selected immigration or border security as their top issue, a sharp fall from the 53% of Texas Republicans in December 2024. The leading issues for Republicans, at 24%, are economy, inflation, or gas prices.

If these kinds of numbers hold, not just with Democrats and Independents, but Republicans too, Ken Paxton would be heading into November far removed from what voters are talking about. To understand how damaging this could be, look no further than Virginia’s gubernatorial election in 2025 (before Iran and a jump in gas prices), where the sitting Lieutenant Governor, Republican Winsome Earle-Sears, lost in a 15-point landslide to Democratic Congresswoman Abigail Spanberger.

Exit polling in Virginia from CNN found that 48% of voters rated the economy as their top concern and 21% said health care. Spanberger won these voters by 27 points and 63 points, respectively. Spanberger remained hyper focused on these issues while Earle-Sears was talking about anti-transgender policies in school and anti-woke policies. While these issues proved effective enough in 2021 to elect Republican Glenn Youngkin to the governorship, with Earle-Sears as his lieutenant, they were not the issues on the minds of voters four years later. It was a base appeal, off the mark enough for Spanberger to win over 27% of voters who approved of Governor Youngkin (who had a 53% approval rating), 15% of non-MAGA Republicans, and flip some rural counties while taking 46% overall of rural Virginia — a significant showing when Democrats nationwide regularly struggle to appeal to rural communities.

If Ken Paxton doesn’t want to end up in second place, he will have to rapidly adjust his focus to a broader swath of Texans. Right now, his focus is on a base-only appeal, which might not cut it when there are more Texans, including some Republicans, who are not part of his core base, and have serious misgivings about the state of things. In the Democratic wave midterms of 2018, Senator Ted Cruz edged out just a 2.5-point margin of victory over Congressman Beto O’Rourke when Trump was relatively more popular, and the economy was humming along. This time around, Trump is much more unpopular, and economic concerns are the single biggest concern for voters.

Will the majority of the base “come home” by November? Most likely in our hyperpartisan era. But without speaking to the concerns of Texans and running a base-only campaign, Paxton runs the risk of putting some Republicans in Talarico’s camp, juicing an already high turnout prediction for Democrats, and stunting turnout from Republicans who don’t like either of their choices.

Imagine, if you will, a generic president. It doesn’t matter which party.

On his watch he’s started an unpopular war (a net -21% for support) without Congressional authorization. Average gas prices nationwide have surged 50% in the last four months and hover around $4.50/gal. Groceries and the general cost of living have continued to rise.

His approval rating has dropped below 40%. And his approval rating is underwater with every major group tracked in polling, across party identification, sex, race, age, and education level. This includes key groups from his base. The near-universal approval rating from his own party has now dropped below 80% for the first time.

But the president is focused on unpopular vanity projects — a White House ballroom, a triumphal arch, the National Mall reflecting pool, and hosting a UFC fight night (to name a few).

His party is also worried as their generic Congressional ballot polling continues a slow slide downward, while the opposition’s numbers rise. His party’s once unshakeable Senate majority is now looking more competitive. He also happens to be in a vindictive mood, going after members of his own party up-and-down the ballot who dare disagree with him on anything, pouring resources into primary challengers or heckling them into retirement.

Amidst all this, the president comes out and says he doesn't think about Americans’ financial situation, when their biggest concerns, by a wide margin, are inflation and costs. Then he doubles down and explicitly says he doesn’t care about the midterms.

I’m of course talking about a generic president (no idea who you’re thinking of). Now, do you see a situation in which, given all this, the midterm elections are not slowing turning into disaster for his party?

I’ll wait…

I earlier wrote about ideology dominating over electability in Republican primaries (see here: Ideology vs. Electability) and Senate Republicans just suffered another casualty from President Trump’s quest to make ideology (i.e., loyalty to him) the key requirement for his support. John Cornyn was a conservative’s conservative and had an 85% lifetime conservative rating from the American Conservative Union. But that wasn’t enough to spare him in the Texas Senate runoff versus the Trump-endorsed Ken Paxton.

Paxton, of course, is (in)famously scandal plagued. I won’t discuss that laundry list, but it begs the question – is there a limit to the power of Trump’s backing in a general election? Do Democrats stand a chance of claiming a seat from Texas for the first time in thirty-eight years with State Rep. James Talarico?

As Anakin Skywalker once said, “This is where the fun begins!”

Texas, of course, has long been a desired prize for Democrats to turn at the statewide level. But try as they have many times to claim its electoral votes, a senate seat, or the governor’s mansion, it has long eluded them. But 2026 is not 2024, 2020, or 2018.

As red as Texas is, Trump is not exactly popular there right now. Polls disagree about whether he has plurality favorability or unfavorability in the Lone Star State, but what they do agree on is that his rating is under 50%. In the generic congressional ballot, Texas has also swung left by nearly double digits relative to its presidential result in 2024. That year, Trump carried the states by 13.68 points, but polling now shows a Republican edge of 3.79 points. That margin has been tightening as well. In April it was a 5.3-point Republican lead and in May it was 4.84.

Does that edge mean it will be a close, but inevitable Paxton win?

The answer is a bit murky – naturally. Or at the Germans of Fredericksburg, Texas would say – natürlich.

Anytime a state goes against what its numbers tell us, it always seems impossible until it happens. But every time it happens, it’s a unique combination of circumstances that push the state over the edge. Usually you have:

1. A flawed nominee

2. High opposition party enthusiasm

3. Underwhelming majority party turnout

So, let’s look no further than two recent examples of an otherwise Republican state that ended up electing a Democrat to the Senate – Alabama and Arizona.

In 2017, Alabama elected Democrat Doug Jones to an open Senate seat in a special election. His Republican opponent, Roy Moore, had a long list of scandals to his name as well, making him a deeply flawed nominee. Jones ended up winning by over a point-and-a-half in a state that the previous year had voted for Trump by over 27 points. He didn’t do so by suddenly making Republicans want to vote Democrat. Exit polling found that just 2% of Republicans voted for Jones. Instead, his victory came about because Democratic enthusiasm was through the roof with 37% of the electorate compared to 43% Republican. The remaining 21% were independents, who went for Jones by an 8-point margin. It was enough to give him a narrow win. But a win is a win.

So: Flawed nominee? Check. High opposition party enthusiasm? Check. Underwhelming majority party turnout? Check.

Now, I know naysayers will point out that this was a special election with 40% turnout. True, and midterm elections are lower turnout affairs to begin with. Texas’s other Senator, Ted Cruz, won re-election in 2018, when Democrats came within 2.5 points of knocking him off, with about a 42% turnout of the voting age population. No one is questioning the legitimacy of Cruz’s win. Others might point out that a few years later Jones was knocked off during a regular election schedule. Also, true. But it doesn’t change the fact that it happened in a state that by all measures should have been an easy Republican hold.

But okay, I’ll see your Alabama and raise you Arizona, which elected Democrat Ruben Gallego to the Senate in 2024 while it also gave Donald Trump its 11 electoral votes. Gallego’s Republican opponent, Kari Lake, while less scandal plagued than Paxton or Moore, was controversial nonetheless in both 2024 and in her 2022 run for governor (also a Republican year than saw Lake lose to Katie Hobbs, giving Democrats the Arizona governorship for the first time since 2006). Gallego won the race by just under 2.5 points while Trump won the state by more than 5.5 points. In this instance, Gallego’s success did come from getting just enough Republicans, 10% according to exit polling, to vote for him over Lake, and additionally eking out a 48%-47% edge with independents. Gallego outperformed Kamala Harris by over 93,000 votes, while Lake underperformed Trump by over 174,000 votes.

Gallego couldn’t even claim to be a moderate in the race. He consistently received high ratings on progressive scorecards as a member of the U.S. House and was vice chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, but he fit himself to the veteran-heavy profile of the state, emphasizing his own service in the Marine Corps and ability to lead. Lake, by contrast, consistently focused on her ties to Trump, which was not enough to carry her.

So: Flawed nominee? Check. High opposition party enthusiasm? Check. Underwhelming majority party turnout? Check, but of course with an asterisk since Gallego over performed Kamala Harris.

Naysayers here will point out this seat was already in Democratic hands with Kyrsten Sinema, that Arizona had already elected Mark Kelly to the Senate and Katie Hobbs as Governor, and that Arizona had swung to Joe Biden in 2020. All of that is true. But it doesn’t change the fact that Trump carried Arizona in 2024 by a healthy 5-point margin and it still wasn’t enough to pull a heavily flawed Lake along with him.

Which brings us back to Texas.

Flawed nominee?

It’s easy to point out Paxton’s many flaws. Talarico’s message to Texas voters last night was to remind them that Paxton has a criminal record. But some of this may already be baked in since Texans have twice elected Paxton as their attorney general. Though Cornyn did a good job of putting Paxton’s dirty laundry front and center, which is going to resonate beyond the GOP base.

High opposition party enthusiasm?

Democrats are over the moon at the thought of winning this seat now. Talarico has a massive cash advantage over Paxton, who has been a weak fundraiser, and we can expect that money to keep coming. Talarico’s campaign reported raising over $600,000 in the hours after Paxton’s primary win. Democrats are also turning out in huge numbers like just about everywhere else in the country. But Talarico also is culturally liberal in a conservative state. How he manages to thread that needle will be key for him.

Underwhelming majority party turnout?

Democrats nationally are riding a high wave of enthusiasm. Polling has found that the percentage of Democrats enthused to vote this year is in the high 60’s or low 70’s, compared to the mid-to-low 50’s for Republicans.

Where Paxton goes from here could make the difference. Does he make a pitch to bring Cornyn supporters into the fold or does he go the way of Kari Lake who told the John McCain wing of the party in Arizona to go to hell? What happens if Cornyn, now liberated, joins Senators Bill Cassidy of Louisiana and Thom Tillis of North Carolina in voting against Trump on certain issues? Does Paxton go scorched earth to remind Trump of his own loyalty while risking alienation of Cornyn supporters?

So: Flawed nominee? Certainly seems so. High opposition party enthusiasm? Building. Underwhelming majority party turnout? TBD.

This is still Texas, so structurally the advantage goes to Paxton. But given the right circumstances Talarico could pave a path to victory. The bottom line is that the Texas Senate race just got a lot more interesting.

Recognize these quotes? In the aftermath of Kamala Harris’s loss to Donald Trump, and the subsequent, albeit delayed, autopsy report from the DNC have painted a bleak picture about how Democrats feel about their party and their prospects for the future.

Only those quotes aren’t about 2024. The first is from the chairman of the Iowa Democratic Party and the second is from former Vice President Walter Mondale, both immediately after John Kerry lost the 2004 presidential race to George W. Bush.

But surely the next two quotes are pulled from the DNC’s report.

Nope. And they’re not even from Democrats.

The first is former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and the second is former Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal lamenting Mitt Romney’s 2012 loss to Barack Obama.

When a political party loses at any level, but especially the national, there is always a lot of soul searching in the aftermath. And by soul searching I mean finger pointing. I get it. I’ve worked on both winning and losing campaigns, and if you’ve never poured your blood, sweat, and tears into a political campaign, take it from me, the sting of a loss cuts deeper than how high the thrill of a win can take you.

But let’s back up a moment.

If the sentiments from 2004 or 2012 proved to be true, then both the Democratic and Republican parties would have never won the White House ever again. But of course, that’s not what happened. Four years after John Kerry’s loss, Barack Obama won by nearly 10 million votes and flipped nine states from red to blue. Cue the handwringing by Republicans for failing to unseat him in 2012. But then four years after that, Donald Trump stunned the world and flipped six states from blue to red, including the previously indestructible “blue wall” of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Cue the handwringing by Democrats. Four years later – blue wall rebuilt. Cue the handwringing by Republicans. Four years later – blue wall destroyed.

You see where I’m going with this.

So, while Democrats are still busy pointing fingers, let’s see what’s going on for the party in the upcoming midterms.

Trust to handle economic issues have been a strength for Trump and Republicans for several years. In 2024, 75% of Americans had said then that inflation was causing them some sort of hardship. Trump won voters who rated the economy in 2024 as bad, 69%-29%. Flash forward to a Fox News poll from April of 2026 and the Democratic Party is now winning on these issues. Voters now trust Democrats by a 4-point margin on handling the economy, 52%-48%. By an 8-point margin, Democrats are trusted to handle inflation and prices, 54%-46%. Trump has a 32% approval ratingand a 64% disapproval rating on handling the economy, and a disastrous 25% approval rating and 72% disapproval rating on handling inflation.

Looking at independents, April polling from Cook Political Report examining the 36 most competitive House districts finds independents giving the president a 70% disapproval rating and favoring Democrats by a whopping 25-point margin. In the 2018 midterms, exit polling found Democrats winning independents by 12 points. The same polling from Cook shows that by a wide 36-point margin, independents feel like the president and Republican have failed to deliver on their promises from 2024.

Let’s drill down a little more into the base of the GOP. A February poll from Fox News found that Republicans lead among non-college whites has falling to 10 points, versus the 34-point margin that Trump won them by in 2024. Like the numbers above, it’s driven by pocketbook issues, with non-college whites from a May Fox News poll giving Trump just a 33% approval rating on the economy and an even lower 25% on handling inflation.

This is a massive collapse, that if holds true on Election Day, would point to a similar situation in 2006 when Republicans won this group by a 6-point margin but were wiped out in the House. Because it’s not enough to just win this group, which has predominately been part of the GOP coalition over the last several years, but they must turn out in large numbers for Republicans too. However, looking back at the last five midterms since 2006, non-college voters turned out by an average 37%, versus Democrat-leaning college voters who have turned out by an average 64%.

Something to point out as well, that level of trust that has swung to Democrats on voters most important issues is based on the generic ballot. Not even an actual candidate with a name who is carrying the banner and leading his or her party. But that can be a double-edged sword for Democrats as they’re benefitting from being the only other viable choice. It doesn’t mean they are popular.

Polling from Gallup finds that the image of the Democratic Party as a national brand sits at a 34% approval rating versus 38% for Republicans. Some of this is driven by Democrats view of their own party, who give it a 73% approval rating compared to 91% for the GOP among Republicans. This is typical of parties in power versus parties out of power. Approval among Republicans of the GOP dropped to 78% in 2021 and 63% in 2009.

But do the Democrats need to be popular to win back Congress? Not necessarily. Midterm elections are always a referendum on the sitting president (see my article on this here: The Midterm Lens), and the pendulum only swings two ways in the U.S. And winning elections can do wonders for a party’s standing, especially among its base. So, when Democrats have a good night in November, expect to see party leaders whistling a different tune and looking ahead with confidence to 2028. If Democrats have a really good night and win some unexpected races or take both the House (pretty much a foregone conclusion) and the Senate (a tall order but the prospects have improved), then expect to see the handwringing among Republicans begin and they’ll start to look beyond the Trump Era in earnest.

So, while autopsies post-loss are fine for understanding why it was a party lost, the pronouncements from those internal players about how much the party is in trouble are overblown. Longstanding majorities are a thing of the 20^th century, not the 21^st. The pendulum swings often and hits hard, but the moment it starts swinging away from one party it’s picking up momentum against the other party (see my article on this here: The Pendulum). We can debate whether this is healthy or chaotic, but it is the political environment we have had for most of the past 26 years.

The single biggest predictor of the outcome of the U.S. House majority in a midterm election is, and for a long time has been, the incumbent president’s approval rating. Period.

Yes, there are issues that are considered: the economy, jobs, inflation, war, or backlash to certain policy. These are the most typical. Sometimes voters just get tired of what they’ve had for several years and are looking to make a change. But every time, voters are looking as these issues through the lens of the sitting president, and how they feel he is doing in his management of them. It is their only opportunity on a nationwide scale to give the president a score on a report card before he either is up for re-election or is termed out of office.

Let’s take a look at the last fourteen midterm elections (1970-2022) to break this down.

The first thing to notice is that in 12 of the last 14 midterm elections the president’s party lost seats in the House. The two times that the president’s party didn’t lose House seats was in 1998 and 2002. In the former, President Clinton was riding a high wave of popular support against what many voters saw as overreach by Republicans in Congress related to the president’s misconduct over his affair with Monica Lewinsky. In 2002, President George W. Bush was also riding a high wave of popularity due to his leadership in the War on Terror, post-9/11.

But popularity alone isn’t enough to save the president’s party in the House. The circumstances of the moment helped both Clinton and George W. Bush. But it wasn’t enough to help George H.W. Bush in 1990, Ronald Reagan in 1986, or Richard Nixon in 1970 — each of whom had a majority percentage approval rating, and a large one in the case of Reagan’s 64% in 1986.

Why is this?

Usually it comes down to the incumbent party, to borrow a phrase from President Trump, growing tired of winning. The party that just lost the White House two years prior is licking its wounds and itching for a fight while the in-party gets a little complacent. The out-party has an easier time of turning out its base and midterms are generally driven by which party turns out its core supporters better, as overall turnout decreases from presidential election years.

Even super high popular approval, like Reagan’s 64% in 1986, doesn’t always help because voters get the “six year itch.” If a president is in his second term, voters generally start to grow weary of the shtick and are ready to turn the page to a new generation, fresh blood, different ideas, etc. That’s hard for any president’s advisors or party stalwarts to ever admit, but it’s the truth.

What happens then if the president is underwater in his approval rating on Election Day?

Be prepared for his party to lose seats in the House. Every time. There has never been an instance of a president underwater in his approval rating (going all the way back to the 1930’s and the advent of the polling industry) and his party gaining House seats in a midterm election.

Does that mean that the president’s party loses their majority and control of the House? Not if they had a huge majority to begin with, but that hasn’t happened since 1978 when Democrats had 292 seats already and losing 15 seats put them nowhere near in danger of dropping below the 218 needed for a majority.

In 2026, the question for Republicans is not if they will lose seats, but how many? President Trump sits below a 40% approval rating. He’s losing support among every major demographic group as I detail in this 2026 Essential: Trump’s Approval. He’s also underwater on his leadership of key issues, which I cover in this 2026 Essential: Trump’s Leadership on Issues. Republicans also hold just a 2-seat majority in the House at 220, meaning just a light breeze is likely to knock them into the minority. Even with all the tinkering with mid-decade redistricting, Democrats are still on track to gain the House with a minimum 4-seat majority. I know because I did the math here: Can redistricting save Republicans?

Midterm Lens

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Senator Bill Cassidy – check. Congressman Thomas Massie – check. Six of eight Indiana state senators – check. Senator John Cornyn – TBD. You may have noticed that President Trump has largely been successful in his 2026 revenge tour against his fellow Republicans.

This revenge has come in the form of primary challengers, often hand selected by the White House, to run against incumbents seen as disloyal to the president. That itself is not surprising. We know that the president demands absolute loyalty. But the eight incumbents who have lost their races didn’t do so by the single stroke of the president’s pen. It was the voters that turned them out of office.

None of these incumbents was a recent entrant to politics. They collectively held 112 years of experience in office between them. Only one of them was in their first term. Everyone else has been re-nominated by their local party over and over and over.

So, what’s changed over those years that suddenly the president says, “not good enough” and the voters acquiesce? Well, consider this number revealed from an NBC News poll from this spring.

The overwhelming majority of Republican primary voters are no longer voting based on the best chance to win (in other words, supporting a candidate who can appeal to the other side with some more centrist positions on issues) but solely on ideological purity. When NBC asked this question in 2023, 56% of Republicans said ideology. So, in the last three years, there has been a double digit jump by Republican primary voters wanting ideological purity.

At the same time, the MAGA makeover of the Republican Party is nearing its completion. March polling from the Economist/YouGov found that 63 percent of Republicans now identify themselves as MAGA, the highest figure yet.

Long gone are the days of the Reagan Revolution, when President Reagan once said of fellow Republicans that 80% a friend is not 20% an enemy. Today’s GOP is 100% loyalty or risk expulsion.

If you’ve found yourself wondering why so much of the 2026 election seems to be focused on affordability, cost of living, or general pocketbooks issues then you’re probably part of the quarter of Americans who approve of President Trump’s handling of inflation.

But for everyone else, economic and personal financial concerns are shaping up to be the top issues on voters minds heading into the election. And it is no wonder that it is these issues that is driving down support for the president and his party, while sending support to congressional Democrats.

In 2024, 45% of Americans rated their personal financial situation as worse than four years prior during Trump’s first term. 75% of Americans had said then that inflation was causing them some sort of hardship. Trump won voters who rated the economy in 2024 as bad 69-29%. That was the ball game. For all that was said in the 2024 election (and there was a lot said), it ultimately boiled down to a pocketbook election for voters — as most elections do.

So, Trump rode back into office on the strength of peoples concerns with Joe Biden’s and the Democrats handling of the economy. People expected Trump to quickly get a handle on things to improve the economy, tame inflation, and while he was at it, secure the border. While he never enjoyed majority support on his handling of these core issues, he began his second term with more goodwill from Americans to get the job done.

A year and a half on, his approval numbers on each of these has soured while the disapproval rating has soared. A midterm election is all about how Americans feel about the person in the White House and his party, making it an uphill climb for Republicans in Congress up for re-election.

Trump Issues May 2026

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Trump Issues June 2026

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To hear Republicans tell it the mid-decade redistricting wins they’ve seen, through both state legislature and court interventions, are going to save their House majority this year.

But will it?

Perhaps a few seats will be saved by Republicans that otherwise would have gone Democratic. But that doesn’t tell the full picture of the uphill climb Republicans face this year. That itself is not that much of an earth-shattering prognostication – it’s a midterm election and Republicans are the incumbent party. Peel back a layer of the onion about voter sentiment and you’ll find a picture more bleak for the GOP than a few additional seats in their column can do to save their House majority.

Voter sentiment shows that every single state has shifted left compared to its 2024 presidential vote.

You read that right. Every single state has shifted left.

When looking at the data of the generic congressional ballot question from polling, you’ll find that every state has shifted left by an average 6.6%. When looking at the median percentage, it shrinks slightly to a 6.2% leftward swing.

Now, I can already hear the naysayers saying “Yea, but Rhode Island…” (the most Democratic swing) or Wyoming (the least Democratic swing) and okay, I see your bet and I’ll raise you. If we remove both the least competitive Democratic and Republican states and just focus on the sixteen states with a competitive House race that swing increases in Democrats favor to an average 7.5% and median 7.4% shift left.

These sixteen states represent a good cross section of red, blue, and swing states at the presidential level and shows the growing backlash against the Republican majority. Even if we remove the five states that have gone through a redistricting (California, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas) the average leftward swing is still a 7.4% margin.

Now, let’s drill down to the individual races. Remember, Democrats need just a net pickup of three seats to take the majority in the House. If we look at Cook Political Report’s toss-up races in states that didn’t redistrict, there are thirteen Republican-held seats that would shift to Democrats based on the incumbents 2024-win margin versus the Democratic polling shift in that state in 2026.

If we add five more seats to the Democratic column due to redistricting and a very favorable flip in the Omaha-centered Nebraska 3^rd district, that put Democratic flips at 18. Now, let’s add 11 seats to the Republican column due to redistricting and a very favorable opportunity in the rural Maine 2^nd district. That still leaves us with a Democratic majority in the House, with four races still unaccounted for. Those four races are FL-25, OH-9, TX-34, and WA-3, all of which have a Democratic incumbent running for re-election who won in 2024 while Donald Trump also won their district. Trump is not on the ballot now and the national environment favors Democrats this time, so we can reasonably keep those four seats in the Democratic column.

That gives us a 7-seat Democratic majority in the House. If we assume that Republicans in southern states successfully redistrict in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the Voting Rights Act, that net’s Republicans one seat a piece in Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee. This reduces the Democratic House majority to four seats.

It is the narrowest of margins and still does not account for other Republican seats that lean in their favor but are still competitive given the unfavorable environment. Polling from Cook Political Report also found that any district President Trump carried by ten points or less in 2024 could be in danger of flipping to Democratic control. This also doesn’t consider the Senate which is becoming more competitive to the GOP’s detriment.

At best, for all the Republicans efforts, they will likely just mitigate losses, rather than retain the House majority – and a Democratic majority all but slams the brakes on President Trump’s agenda for his final two years in office.

If you’ve ever found yourself wondering why it seems like nothing gets done in Washington, the answer is simple – the pendulum of power only swings two ways, and in the 21^st century, it swings often.

We have now had six elections in a row (2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024) where party control has changed in at least one of either the House of Representatives, Senate, or the White House. This sets the record of constant churn in our two-party era (which I count since 1874, post-Civil War and all Confederate states readmitted to the Union). But we have also set the record going all the way back to the first election under our constitution in 1788 when there was more rise and fall to major and minor parties, versus the firm two-party hold we know now. Both pre-1874 and since 1874 the record was five consecutive elections of change.

All indications point to a lengthening of the record in 2026 to seven consecutive elections.

So…what gives?

The first thing to understand is that a midterm election, like 2026, almost always go against the party that holds the White House. It is voters’ opportunity to cast judgement on the party in power. The opposition party is usually more enthused to vote. The party in power is generally worn down.

The second thing to recognize is that we are a narrowly divided country. No president has won the national popular vote by double digits since Ronald Reagan’s 18-point landslide in 1984. Since then, the closest anyone has come is George H.W. Bush and Barack Obama’s 7-point wins in 1988 and 2008, respectively. But in ten presidential elections since 1984 the average difference between the popular vote winner and loser was 4.4 points. In half of those elections, neither candidate achieved a popular vote majority (50%+1). In two of those elections, the popular vote winner was not elected president.

In Congress, the numbers are even more narrowly divided. Since the 1874 election, both parties enjoyed periods where they held large, sustained majorities in both the House and Senate, holding 60% or more of seats. But the 21^st century has seen small majorities that continually flipflop. Since the 107^th Congress (2001-2003), both parties have held an average 49 out of the 100 seats in the Senate, neither party growing their majority beyond the 58 held by Democrats beginning in the 111^th Congress (2009-2011). The same period in the House has seen Republicans hold an average 50.9% of the 435 seats, while Democrats have held an average 48.9%. Neither party has exceeded the Democrats 59% of seats in the House, held during the 111^th Congress.

The final part to understand is the pure politics of it all.

When the pendulum swings back and forth this quickly, and it only takes a stiff breeze to knock over a majority in Congress, there is no incentive for either party to want to do too much to help each other out. It’s easier to demonize and make a reasonable bet you’ll be back in charge if you’re the currently minority party. Then the majority becomes the minority and the cycle begins anew.

The Pendulum

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